TL;DR

Sample: ANY.RUN
ShadowAgent is a RAT masquerading as a PDF document and targeting government systems. Its primary goal is to send confidential information to attackers using WebSockets and HTTP for continuous command and control exchange.
How to detect: Detection is possible by monitoring abnormal mutex creation.
Key facts:
Analytical note:
| Detected | External sources | ANY.RUN First Submission | Sandbox Evasion | VT First Submission |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025-12-01 | TI | 2025-12-10 | 3 | 2025-11-03 |
With the following TI Lookup query, we can search through recent public sandbox analyses and identify this malicious activity.
TI Lookup:
syncObjectName:"asus_*_v"
IOCs:
9680a1f6d24c499becf5d497abbc0ba7d140a4ad6c814336b45d9ee4189a07c058d4429ac78b74b64843fe4fbdfd3f4a41ee1139a0b2c7a41dc8e10f0d207780www[.]mydropboxbackup[.]comMITRE:
| Technique ID | Technique Name | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| T1053 | Scheduled Task/Job | Creates scheduled task for persistence |
| T1480.002 | Execution Guardrails: Mutual Exclusion | Actions based on the presence of a mutex associated with malware |
| T1497.003 | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time Based Checks | Uses Task Scheduler to run other applications |
| T1012 | Query Registry | Reads security settings of browsers and different system settings via registry |
| T1082 | System Information Discovery | Reads different system information |

Sample: ANY.RUN
UDPGangster is a UDP-oriented backdoor associated with the MuddyWater group. After executing a macro in a document, the trojan is installed in the user profile. It supports remote command execution, file uploads, and exfiltration via UDP channels, complicating network detection.
How to detect: Detection is possible by monitoring registry writes to HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell for startup persistence and the mutex named xhxhxhxhxhxpp.
Key facts:
Analytical note:
| Detected | External sources | ANY.RUN First Submission | Sandbox Evasion | VT First Submission |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025-11-25 | News | 2025-11-25 | 7 | 2025-10-11 |
With the following TI Lookup query, we can search through recent public sandbox analyses and identify this malicious activity.
TI Lookup:
syncObjectName:"xhxhxhxhxhxpp"
TI Lookup:
commandLine:"cmd.exe /c start*msedge.exe*.pdf" or registryValue:"AppData\\RoamingLow"
IOCs:
930f0dc9929c6097f718b42d1dbad42d0263ffac5d598a81fc6fa1ea1f58c41cxhxhxhxhxhxpp64.7.198.12MITRE:
| Technique ID | Technique Name | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| T1566.001 | Phishing: Attachment | Used PDF lure for payload delivery. |
| T1204.002 | User Execution: Malicious File | Backdoor launch occurs after manual PDF opening. |
| T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys | Persistence through HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell. |
| T1059.003 | Windows Command Execution | Execution of operator's control commands through shell. |
| T1071.001 | Web Protocol: HTTP | C2 traffic and command retrieval via HTTP. |
1) RATs continue to masquerade as documents: Both samples demonstrate the use of PDF for infiltrating government systems with a focus on data exfiltration.
2) Backdoors are using UDP: UDPGangster from MuddyWater uses UDP for C2; recently, various methods of C2 communication have been encountered, so it's necessary to ensure that at least the main protocols for communication are covered.